We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a dominant strategy, we find that bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in the fixed price mechanism. For some parameter values this yields the surprising result that the fixed price mechanism outperforms the auction.
Introduction
The three commonly used methods to sell shares in an initial public offering (IPO) are bookbuilding, open offer (or fixed price), and auctions. While bookbuilding and open offer have been predominant for a long time, auctions, recently held over the internet, are becoming more and more popular. It is still an open question which mechanism best serves the purpose of the seller. This is certainly due to the multitude of aspects to be taken into consideration.
Many papers on IPOs concentrate on informational aspects. Since the value of the issue is usually insufficiently known, the seller needs to gather information from large (informed) investors. Several authors show that bookbuilding allows to credibly extract information from large investors and thereby reduces the uncertainty about the issue. When compared to an auction, bookbuilding leads to more efficient information acquisition, since it gives the seller total discretion in the allocation of shares.
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To a lesser extent this also holds true for the fixed price method.
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While these informational aspects seem to be crucial in the relationship between seller and large investors, revenue is likely to be a predominant concern if it comes to selling shares to retail investors. Consider, for example, the following hybrid procedure which is indeed used in many countries: 3 First, the seller allocates a proportion of shares to (informed) large investors 1 Benveniste and Wilhelm (1989) show that with bookbuilding underpricing is necessary to effectively extract information from investors. Sherman and Titman (2000) analyze the bookbuilding method when information acquisition by large investors is costly. Moreover, Sherman (2000a) shows that bookbuilding leads to more efficient information acquisition than auctions.
2 Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) study a model with informed regular investors and uninformed retail investors. A combination of price and allocation discrimination between these groups leads to efficient revelation of the information held by informed investors.
However, price discrimination is not allowed in some countries. Furthermore, there are fairness rules which regulate the allocation of shares.
3 Sherman (2000a) provides a survey of IPO methods used by more than 40 countries.
using a bookbuilding mechanism. Second, he sells the remaining shares to (uninformed) retail investors, using either a fixed price mechanism or an auction. Since information extraction is not the issue at this stage, the seller would like to choose the mechanism that maximizes expected revenue.
There are several reasons why selling shares to retail investors is important. To start with, it is a means of limiting the control of large investors over the firm. Furthermore, the issue may be too large to be absorbed by institutional investors only. Finally, the widespread availability of the internet makes the distribution of information by the seller and the placing of orders by retail investors cost-efficient and easy.
The aim of this paper is to compare the fixed price method and a uniform price auction when demand is uncertain (it can be either high or low) and there is a large number of potential buyers, who have private valuations.
These assumptions seem to be justified if we consider the second stage of the mechanism described above, because it is reasonable to assume that the outcome of the bookbuilding stage will reveal the information held by institutional investors. Thus, after the bookbuilding stage, the common value of the issue is public information and demand of retail investors only depends on their preferences.
Moreover, a comparison of the two mechanisms is interesting in itself, since one can easily find other situations that (approximately) fit in our framework. Consider, for example, a farmer's decision how to sell next season's crop. Since output and quality depend on publicly observable uncertain factors like the weather, the value is also uncertain. The farmer can either sell now at a fixed price (which corresponds to the fixed price mechanism) or after the harvest when the exact value is known (this yields the same revenue as the uniform price auction).
Usually, the fixed price method includes fairness rules which allow discrimination of buyers only on the basis of order size. In some countries, Under proportional rationing with demand uncertainty bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed in high demand scenarios. We show that the fixed price mechanism has a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where bidders are rationed in the high demand scenario while there is no rationing in the low demand scenario.
In equilibrium, buyers demand substantially more than their desired quantity.
Furthermore, we show that in a private values framework with a large number of small bidders truthful bidding a is dominant strategy in the uniform price auction. Thus, the auction yields the same revenue as if the seller was perfectly informed about demand. Therefore, it seems quite intuitive that the auction is the more profitable way to sell shares when demand is uncertain. As Sherman (2000a) puts it, "most finance academics would probably guess that auctions would be the best way to maximize the seller's revenues". However, to the best of our knowledge, this conjecture was never analyzed from a game-theoretic perspective.
The comparison of the two mechanisms yields a surprising result: under certain parameter conditions the fixed price method outperforms the auction in terms of revenue. More precisely, this is the case when the return per share is relatively safe and aggregate demand is more likely to be low. Otherwise, the revenue in the fixed price mechanism is only slightly lower than the revenue in the auction. Moreover, since the variance of the payoff is lower in a fixed price mechanism 4 , a risk-averse seller would presumably prefer the fixed price method to the auction.
Uniform price auctions with a large number of bidders have been studied by Nautz (1995) for risk-neutral bidders and Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997) for risk-averse bidders. In both papers the authors argue that if there is a 4 In many cases the revenue has zero variance at the price which maximizes expected revenue. This is shown in section 4.3.
large number of bidders they act as price takers in a uniform price auction and therefore bid truthfully. Swinkels (2001) analyzes equilibria of uniform price auctions as the number of bidders tends to infinity and finds that the optimal strategy converges to truthful bidding. Moulin (2000) and Herrero (2000) provide axiomatic analysis of rationing schemes. They show that proportional rationing is among the three rationing methods that satisfy "equal treatment of the equals", i.e. the allocation depends on bids only, and certain other procedural requirements. Moreover, the proportional rule is "fair", since the ratio of supply to demand is the same for all buyers. Finally, collusion of a group of buyers has no impact on the allocation to other buyers. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that analyzes proportional rationing from a game theoretic perspective is Nautz and Oechssler (1999) . However, they obtain a nonexistence result that is due to the fact that bidders know that they are always rationed (there is no demand uncertainty).
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 contains an analysis of the auction. In section 4 we present the fixed price mechanism. Then, we derive the equilibrium strategies of the buyers.
Finally, we characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the entire game.
Section 5 compares the expected revenue in the fixed price mechanism and the auction. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix unless they provide an intuition for the results.
The Model
One perfectly divisible unit of shares is to be sold by one seller who seeks to maximize expected revenue.
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The final payoff per unit is a random variable Y which is normally distributed with mean µ = 1 and variance σ
There is a continuum θ, θ of (potential) buyers, where θ > 0. The Bernoulli utility function of buyer θ is given by
which means that θ −1 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The type θ is private information of each buyer and the distribution of buyers is given by a (probability) distribution function F . We assume that F has no atoms, which implies that a single buyer has no weight, i.e. all buyers are small (retail) investors. The total mass of buyers is not perfectly known. Instead, there are two possible scenarios: in scenario 1 the mass is m 1 > 0 while in scenario 2 the mass is m 2 > m 1 . Thus, the distribution of buyers in scenario i is given by the cdf
Since the (probability) distribution F over types is the same in each scenario, no buyer can infer the true distribution from his type. We assume that all buyers and the seller have the same probability belief g 1 ∈ [0, 1] that scenario 1 is the true scenario. All this is common knowledge.
Denote the wealth of buyer θ by w θ .
It follows that individual demand is
By integration we see that aggregate demand at price p in scenario i is
where
Since γ 2 > γ 1 we can interpret scenario 1 and 2 as low demand scenario and high demand scenario, respectively. It follows from equation (5) that inverse demand in scenario i is
Recall that the seller can sell at most one unit. Therefore, the market clearing 
From the first-order condition γ i (µ − 2p) ≤ 0 and the constraint p ≥ µ − 1 γ i it follows that the monopoly price is
We assume that capacity is scarce in every szenario, i.e. p i = P i (1) for
Uniform Price Auction
When an auction is used for an IPO it is most often uniform-price sealedbid.
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This auction format meets various requirements like charging all cus-8 See for example Kandel et al. (1999) 
The rules of the auction are as follows: Bidders have to submit their demand schedules. Thereafter, aggregate revealed demand is calculated. The auctioneer chooses the highest price such that aggregate revealed demand equals supply, i. e. in scenario i the auction price is
Bidder θ obtains d(p A,i , θ) shares at unit price p A,i . If no market clearing price exists the seller keeps the shares and the bidders pay nothing.
The following lemma shows that if a market clearing price exists in scenario i the revenue in the auction in this scenario is equal to the revenue which a monopolist would obtain under complete information.
Lemma 1 In any pure strategy equilibrium the auction price in scenario i is
9 Cf. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) .
Proof Since there is continuum of buyers, a single buyer's bid has no impact on aggregate revealed demand.
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Therefore, bidders act as price takers. The continuum also implies that in any (pure strategy) equilibrium of the game there are only two equilibrium prices p A,1 and p A,2 , which occur with positive probability. Thus, it is strictly dominant for buyer θ to demand
Since supply is normalized to one, we also
If we restrict our attention to equilibria with market clearing we obtain the following result, which immediately follows from the lemma.
Theorem 1 The expected revenue in the auction is
Quite intuitively, the expected revenue increases as the probability of the high demand scenario increases. As we have shown in lemma 1, the revenue in the auction is equal to the revenue that would be raised under complete information about the demand scenario. Note that this implies that setting a reservation price does not improve the auction. Moreover, the auction is strategically very simple for both, the seller and the buyers. None of them needs to take into consideration any information except for their own in order to derive their optimal strategies. These properties make the auction a very appealing selling mechanism.
10 It is well known that uniform price auctions create an incentive to reduce demand on all but the first unit if bidders may influence the price by their bid. See, for example, Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993) . However, for a continuum of buyers a single buyer has no impact on aggregate revealed demand. This is similar to the results of Nautz and Wolfstetter (1997) and Swinkels (2001) , who analyze auctions when there is a large number of bidders.
Fixed Price plus Proportional Rationing
In this section we describe and analyze the second mechanism: offering shares at a fixed price and applying proportional rationing in the case of excess demand. In addition to being used in some countries, proportional rationing seems to be a good approximation for other rationing methods applied in IPOs, since it satisfies certain fairness rules.
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While priority rules may also be used to allocate shares to specific groups of investors, proportional rationing is most likely being applied within these groups. 
is called rationing factor.
Recall that in our model the seller can sell at most one unit. Thus, bidders are rationed whenever aggregate revealed demand exceeds 1. However, revealed demand may also fall short of 1. Then, each bidder gets the demanded quantity.
Intuitively, one would guess that proportional rationing provides the buyers with an incentive to overstate their demand in order to alleviate the negative effect of being rationed. This raises two questions: First, does the fixed price mechanism have an equilibrium at all 12 and, if so, can the expected 11 For a detailed analysis of the properties of proportional rationing and other rationing rules cf. Moulin (2000) or Herrero (2000) . 12 This is also of practical relevance, since it is not very appealing to use a selling mechanism that has no equilibrium. Nautz and Oechssler (1999) showed that there is no equilibrium of the proportional rationing game when demand is certain.
revenue in the fixed price mechanism possibly exceed the expected revenue in the auction?
The latter would certainly be impossible if the optimal strategy was to truthfully reveal demand at the posted price. However, as a lower bound for the revenue raised by fixed price plus proportional rationing, think of a rationing method that implies truthful bidding.
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In such a mechanism, there is always excess supply in scenario 1 and excess demand in scenario 2 if the seller sets a price between p 1 and p 2 .
Under proportional rationing bidders can increase the (too low) quantity they get in the high demand scenario (where they are rationed) by demanding more than their true demand. Since this also increases demand in the low demand scenario, the seller's expected payoff is certainly higher than under truthful bidding and the market clears at prices strictly higher than p 1 .
However, it is not obvious whether revealed demand is high enough to allow for charging a price that yields a higher expected payoff than the auction.
In order to be able to compare the expected revenues in the auction and the fixed price mechanism we characterize the equilibrium of the fixed price method in this section.
The Game
We start with the description of the game. 
Now, we can determine the players' payoffs. As in section 3, denote buyer
13 One such method is the so-called uniform gains rule. Cf. Moulin (2000) .
in scenario i is given by (10). For simplicity we denote the corresponding rationing factor by
Since the true scenario is unknown, the rationing factor is a random variable Q with realization Q i in scenario i.
The seller's revenue in scenario i is given by
Hence, expected revenue is
Since a bidder cannot discern the two scenarios, his decision has to be based on some probability belief as follows:
of a probability η(p, θ) ∈ [0, 1] which the player assigns to scenario 1.
For a given belief η and rationing factor Q the expected utility of buyer θ under proportional rationing is
Note that the expected utility of buyer θ depends only on the aggregate numbers Q 1 and Q 2 while individual demand of other buyers plays no role.
14 To solve the game we apply the concept of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Adapting the definitions in Mas-Colell et al. 1. The strategy profile ψ * is sequentially rational given E.
Note that in a pure strategy equilibrium the information set corresponding to p * is reached with probability 1. Moreover, the equilibrium price p * is completely uninformative, because seller and buyers have the same information regarding the true scenario. Thus, the only constraint on beliefs is that on the equilibrium path all buyers have the same belief which is given by (19).
Best Response
In this section we derive the best response (optimal demand) of a single buyer θ at price p for a given aggregate revealed demand of other buyers. Since there is a continuum of buyers, a single buyer's demand d has no influence on aggregate revealed demand D i in scenario i. We assume that D 1 < D 2 which implies Q 1 > Q 2 .
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Assume that buyer θ's belief at price p is η. His best response to a given rationing factor Q is a solution to the following optimization problem:
The following lemma shows that there is a unique best response which is the product of true demand α (p, θ) and a type-independent markup factor x Q which depends on the buyer's belief η and the price p.
Lemma 2 There is a unique revealed demand
which maximizes the utility of buyer θ. The markup factor x Q does not depend on the buyer's type θ. Moreover, it holds that
. 15 We will show later that this inequality holds in equilibrium.
Proof To begin with, note that the conditional distribution of
) . Thus, the first-order condition of buyer θ's optimization problem is
Since α (p, θ) > 0, we can decompose d as follows:
where x is the relative markup over the optimal number of shares. In scenario i the buyer gets
shares. Obviously, a choice of x, where the buyer has to consider the trade-off between getting too little shares in the case of high demand and getting too many shares in the case of low demand. Now, we show that there is a unique solution to the buyer's problem.
Substituting xα (p, θ) for d in the first-order condition and multiplying by x
where h p is defined by
and
It is shown in the appendix that a unique solution
to (23) exists. Since E η h p x Q does not depend on θ, the markup factor is also type-independent. Inserting x Q into decomposition (22) completes the proof.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we characterize equilibria of the fixed price mechanism. Since all buyers have the same information with respect to scenarios and observe the same price p, we make the following assumption: at least A 1 (p). Since there is only one unit for sale, the seller will never set a price below p 1 .
From optimality of p 2 in scenario 2 it follows that a price p > p 2 can only be an equilibrium price if D i (p) > A i (p) for i = 1, 2. In this case there is a positive mass of buyers who get too many shares in both scenarios. The fact that these buyers would gain by reducing their bids implies that a price larger than p 2 cannot be an equilibrium price.
For a given price p and a belief η = η (p) the set of sequentially rational strategies of buyers' coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the game which corresponds to the bidding stage. Thus, although the bidding stage is no (sub-) game in a strict sense we speak of an equilibrium of the bidding stage.
The bidding stage starts after a price p ∈ [p 1 , p 2 ] has been announced by the seller. In an equilibrium of this stage buyers take aggregate demand D and rationing factor Q as given and play their best response x Q α (p, θ).
Recall that x Q depends only on p and the common belief η = η (p). Thus, if
It follows that an equilibrium of the bidding stage is described by a common markup factor x = x (p, η) which solves (23) where Q is given by its
In order to emphasize that Q is the rationing factor which corresponds to x we write Q x . From identity (27) it follows that
in equilibrium. In particular, revealed demand in scenario 2 is larger than revealed demand in scenario 1, i. e. scenario 2 is the high demand scenario. The equilibrium markup factor solves
The following theorem shows that a unique equilibrium (in pure strategies) of the bidding stage exists if the price is higher than a reference price that depends on beliefs. Proof See the appendix.
By combining lemma 2 and theorem 2 we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Let p ∈ (p e , p 2 ) and η ∈ (0, 1) . In the equilibrium of the bidding stage there is no rationing in scenario 1 while all buyers are rationed in scenario 2. In particular, it holds that the supply to buyer θ is
Proof See the appendix.
The corollary shows that in equilibrium the number of shares which a buyer gets in the high demand scenario does not depend on x while the number of shares in the low demand scenario exceeds true demand by a factor of x. Therefore, the markup factor x is optimally chosen such that a marginal increase of the bid would increase the buyer's utility in scenario 2 by the same amount as it would decrease his utility in scenario 1. In equilibrium the quantity a buyer gets in scenario 2 is given by α(p, θ)/A 2 and therefore marginal utility in the high demand scenario is fixed. 
Remark 1 (No Trade) It can be shown that with exponential utility and proportional rationing there is no incentive for aftermarket trade. At the final allocation the willingness to pay for an additional unit is independent of the buyer's type.
Now that we have characterized the equilibrium of the second stage of the game, we can solve for the equilibrium of the entire game. The seller's objective is to maximize expected revenue anticipating the choice of the equilibrium markup factor at the second stage. Recall that beliefs depend on the posted price. In any pure strategy equilibrium of the game the system of beliefs has to satisfy η(p * ) = g 1 at the equilibrium price.
The seller's revenue R i in scenario i at a price p ∈ [p e (η) , p 2 ] is given by
respectively. Hence, the expected revenue is
It is straightforward to show that π R is a continuous function.
Define a system of common beliefs η on [p 1 , p e (g 1 )] by
The intuition for this construction is as follows: g 1 is the objective ex ante probability that the true scenario is scenario 1. Given this probability a rational seller will set a price p ≥ p e (g 1 ), because the market clears at p e .
If buyers believe that the seller acts rational they will doubt that g 1 is the true probability of scenario 1 when the seller sets a price below p e (g 1 
Proof By definition of η * an equilibrium of the bidding stage exists for all p ∈ [p 1 , p 2 ] and is characterized by a common markup factor x (p, η * (p)).
Thus, equilibrium demand of buyer θ at price p is given by
At price p e (g 1 ) all shares are sold in both scenarios which implies that expected profit is save and equal to p e (g 1 The theorem shows that the equilibrium payoff
is uniquely determined if we add the restriction that beliefs are derived by Bayes' rule wherever possible. This restriction is equivalent to η (p) = g 1 for p ≥ p e (g 1 ).
The 
Comparative Statics
In this section we study the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium markup factor x at a price p > p e (g 1 ) with respect to σ 2 .
To characterize the effect of the asset's risk on the equilibrium markup factor we fix p ∈ (p e (g 1 ) , p 2 ) and γ i (i = 1, 2).
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That is, we assume that θ. It holds that
Consider the indirect utility function
Recall that the equilibrium markup factor x solves an optimal trade-off between the two demand scenarios, i.e. the expected marginal benefit of overstating demand in scenario 2 equals the expected marginal loss of doing so in scenario 1. In equilibrium, the marginal utilities of buyer θ are V A −1 2 in scenario 2 and V (x) in scenario 1, respectively. Now, as c varies the equilibrium quantity in scenario 2 does not change, since A 2 remains constant. However, since c determines the marginal utilities in scenario 1 and 2,
x depends on c. In the sequel, we characterize this dependence of x on c.
First, we rewrite the equilibrium condition (29) as
To analyze the behaviour of (36) with respect to changes in c we define
For ∆ > 0 the RHS of (36) is strictly increasing in c, while for ∆ < 0 it is strictly decreasing. For ∆ = 0 the RHS is constant in c. Since c > 0 and
x ≥ 1, the RHS is strictly decreasing in x while the LHS is strictly increasing.
It follows that in the case ∆ > 0 an increase in c has to be compensated by an increase in x which, in turn, decreases ∆. For ∆ < 0 it is the other way around.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let x be the equilibrium markup factor at p, for parameters 
Auction versus Fixed Price
Now we are prepared to compare the revenues in the two mechanisms. In the fixed price mechanism, as we have shown in the previous section, bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand under proportional rationing which raises the expected revenue at a given price. However, because of the fixed price, this mechanism does not adapt to the realized scenario. In the auction, prices optimally adapt to the realized scenario while for a given price demand is lower than in the fixed price mechanism. Thus, we have to find out which of these properties is the more important one. We will show that the answer to this question is ambiguous and depends on the model parameters.
It seems impossible to derive the expected profit in the fixed price method explicitly. Instead, we use an indirect approach, where we compare the expected revenues in the auction and the fixed price mechanism with a benchmark revenue. The benchmark revenue is the expected revenue which would obtain if buyers bid as if they were risk-neutral when choosing the markup factor under proportional rationing. First, we prove in lemma 4 that the benchmark revenue and the expected revenue in the auction are equal. Then, in lemma 5, we compare the markup factor in the fixed price mechanism with the markup factor in the benchmark case. Finally, we use these lemmas to obtain a comparison of the auction and the fixed price mechanism (theorem 4).
If a buyer is risk-neutral with respect to the choice of the markup factor x he maximizes his utility given the expected valueQ
defined in section 4.3. The first-order condition (23) becomes
Thus, the benchmark markup factor solves x =Q −1
x which ensures that buyer θ gets α (p, θ) shares in expectation.
Since there is only one unit for sale, the fixed price mechanism cannot raise a higher expected revenue than the auction if the price is below π A .
Thus, we can restrict our analysis to prices p ≥ π A .
In the following lemma we derive the benchmark markup factor and show that benchmark revenue and auction revenue are equal.
Let the benchmark markup factor x B be the solution to (38) and denote the benchmark revenue by π B . It holds that
The optimal benchmark revenue is
Part (i) of the lemma shows that the benchmark markup factor x B does not depend on σ 2 . In particular, x B does not depend on the slope of the indirect utility function V . In contrast, the equilibrium markup factor x does depend on the slope of V which varies in σ 2 . In the following lemma we use the first-order condition (29) to compare the markup factors x B and x. 
Proof The proof proceeds in 4 steps. ) h p (y), as defined by (24), is convex (see the appendix) and it holds by Jensen's inequality that
Since the left hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing, we
conclude that x ≤ x B in this case.
2. We take a closer look at the equilibrium equation (36) to derive conditions for x > x B and x ≤ x B , respectively. It is straightforward to
show that x > x B or p e (g 1 ) > p is equivalent to
Recall that x B does not depend on c. As in the preceding section we use ∆, as defined by (37), to analyze the behaviour of (39).
If ∆ > 0 it holds that the RHS of (39) is strictly increasing in c with ] corresponds to ∆ ≤ 0. From lemma 4 we know that
and thus
We conclude 
This proves part (ii) of the lemma.
From lemma 4 we know that the optimal benchmark revenue π * B is equal to the expected auction revenue π A . It follows from part (ii) of the same lemma that proportional rationing yields a lower payoff than the auction if the equilibrium markup factor x is smaller than the benchmark markup factor x B . By lemma 5 this is the case if g 1 ∈ (0, Since all shares are sold at price p e (g 1 ) under the fixed price mechanism, we conclude that π * R > π A .
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These surprising results are summarized in our main theorem.
19 Note that the equilibrium price in the fixed price mechanism might be larger than p e (g 1 ). Moreover, since the seller chooses the optimal price from the set [p e (g 1 ) , p 2 ], the critical value of σ 2 depends only on g 1 .
Theorem 4 (Comparison of Revenues)
] the revenue in the fixed price mechanism does not exceed the revenue in the auction.
(ii) If g 1 ∈ ( 6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have characterized the equilibria of a uniform price auction and a fixed price mechanism when a perfectly divisible good is sold to a large number of bidders. In addition, we have compared the expected revenues in the two mechanisms.
In the uniform price auction truthful bidding is an equilibrium. Moreover, in any pure strategy equilibrium the seller's revenue in each scenario equals the monopoly price given true demand.
Fixed price mechanisms, although frequently used in practice, have, to the best of our knowledge, never been analyzed in a game-theoretic framework with uncertain demand. We have shown that a pure strategy equilibrium of the fixed price mechanism exists. In equilibrium bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed in the high demand scenario. It follows that there is always a price, where the revenue is safe (i. e. the whole quantity is sold in both scenarios) and strictly higher than the revenue in the auction when demand is low. Moreover, the revenue in the fixed price mechanism is typically less volatile than the revenue in the auction. We have also shown that revealed demand depends on the variance of the asset that is offered for sale.
A comparison of the two mechanisms yields a surprising result: For certain parameter values, namely a low variance of the asset and, at the same time, a sufficiently high probability of low demand, the fixed price mechanism raises a higher expected revenue than the uniform price auction. This is rather counterintuitive, because in each scenario the uniform price auction yields the same payoff as in the case of perfect information. However, imperfect information allows the seller to ask for a price that is close to, or even higher, than the average price that bidders would be willing to pay in the case of perfect information.
The analysis shows that a seller may benefit from demand uncertainty.
Our results might contribute to understanding decisions of how and when to sell. Consider, for example, a firm that produces a good, where demand is uncertain today and is revealed in the next period. Should the firm sell before or after demand is observed? If the alternatives are to sell immediately at a fixed price or to wait until aggregate demand is known our framework applies. Using a fixed price mechanism corresponds to selling immediately while the auction yields the same revenue as selling after demand has been observed.
The ranking of the two mechanisms from the seller's point of view might not only depend on the expected revenue but also on the volatility of the payoff and on the minimum payoff (in the case of low demand). As to the first point, a risk-averse seller might prefer the fixed price mechanism even if the expected revenue is smaller than in the auction. In particular, the variance of the revenue is zero in the fixed price mechanism if the seller posts the market clearing price. Another advantage of the fixed price method, as compared to the auction, relates to the second point: Since bidders exaggerate their demand in order to avoid severe rationing in the high demand scenario, aggregate revealed demand will also be high in the low demand scenario. This enables the seller to raise a higher minimum revenue than in the auction. These issues are discussed in more detail in Bierbaum and Grimm (2002) , where numerical simulations are used to provide further insights.
Our findings might provide an additional justification for the frequent use of fixed price mechanisms to allocate shares in initial public offerings. During the last decade auctions were proposed by many authors as an alternative to the commonly used fixed price procedures. However, even in our theoret- have assumed that the number of bidders is large. In contrast, if the number of bidders is small each bid has an impact on the price and the allocation, which strongly affects incentives. For the uniform price auction it is well known that with a small number of bidders, who demand several units each, there are equilibria which yield a rather low revenue due to demand reduction. In the fixed price mechanism bidding less than one's true demand is still a strictly dominated strategy. However, we have not found a satisfactory characterization of the equilibria of the rationing game when a single bidder's demand has an impact on aggregate demand. These issues await further research.
To simplify notation we introduce the function
Taking the derivative of φ w.r.t. x yields
Thus, x → φ (x, p, η) is strictly increasing on [1, x p ) and constant on [x p , ∞) .
We conclude that φ (x, p, η) is maximized by x p . For x = 1 we get It is easy to show that a number x which has xA 1 > 1 cannot be a solution to this equation. Therefore, we assume that xA 1 ≤ 1 to get 21 the following condition:
Solving for x yields (recall that A i = γ i (1 − p))
Thus, revealed demand in scenario 1 is given by 
and the derivative of π B ,
is obviously decreasing in p. Since γ 1 ≥ 2 and γ 2 > γ 1 it holds that
Thus, marginal profit is negative at p = π A . This also holds for all p ∈ [π A , p 2 ], since marginal profit, as given by (44), is decreasing. Since revealed demand at p = π A is equal to one and profit is decreasing in p for p ∈ [π A , p 2 ], the benchmark case yields the same expected profit as the auction, which proves part (b) of the lemma.
